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INTRODUCTION 
This spring marks the fortieth anniversary of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,1 the landmark student speech 
case decided in 1969 in which the Supreme Court held that three 
students were protected by the First Amendment when they wore 
black armbands in their Des Moines, Iowa public schools to protest 
the Vietnam War.2  Tinker was quite a departure from what came 
before it; prior to Tinker, it was not a foregone conclusion that 
students had any affirmative free speech rights in public schools.3  
Looking at Supreme Court precedent alone, it would seem as though 
the Tinker tests were created out of whole cloth:  the substantial or 
material disruption, reasonable anticipation of such disruption, and 
rights of others tests did not have much of a basis in earlier Supreme 
Court decisions.4  But, the district court in Tinker had employed the 
first two of these tests.5  For authority, it had looked to the Fifth 
Circuit’s decisions six weeks prior in two cases involving high school 
students’ speech about civil rights:  Burnside v. Byars6 and Blackwell v. 
Issaquena County.7 
Burnside and Blackwell arose out of separate Mississippi 
communities, yet the speech in the two cases was largely the same:  at 
the height of the Civil Rights Movement, groups of high school 
                                                 
 1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 2. Id. at 523–24. 
 3. See, e.g., Richard L. Berkman, Students in Court:  Free Speech and the Functions of 
Schooling in America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567, 568–69, 580 (1970) (“A notable 
departure from this tradition of judicial timidity is [Tinker] . . . . Implicit in this 
decision was a view of the purposes and methods of education different from that 
traditionally expressed by American courts. . . . [In Tinker,] there is n one of the 
familiar rhetoric about the disciplinary purposes of education.”). 
 4. Id. at 509, 513. 
 5. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. 
Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 6. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 7. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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students in the Deep South wore buttons to school protesting the 
denial of voting rights to African-Americans.  In one case, wearing 
buttons was the full extent of the conduct; in the other case, the 
students wore buttons and also distributed them in a reportedly 
aggressive manner that interrupted the school day.  These two cases 
were consolidated at the appellate level and decided by the same 
panel of the Fifth Circuit in 1966.8  Without citation to any 
supporting authority, the Fifth Circuit applied an actual disruption 
test in both Burnside and Blackwell, finding disruption in one case but 
not in the other and protecting the non-disruptive student speech 
under the First Amendment.9  Although the Fifth Circuit did not 
make explicit reference to the civil rights protest cases, Burnside and 
Blackwell grew out of a regional social context in which both violent 
and non-violent civil rights protests occurred with regularity, and a 
legal context in which the constitutionality of arresting and 
convicting nonviolent protesters for offenses such as breach of the 
peace increasingly was challenged.10 
Aside from Tinker’s citations to Burnside and Blackwell, those two 
cases—the roots of Tinker’s disruption tests—have largely been lost to 
history.11  Accordingly, Part I of this Article scrutinizes Burnside and 
Blackwell, sketching the social context and civil rights struggles out of 
which these cases emerged, tracing the events that preceded 
litigation, and examining the district courts’ opinions and the Fifth 
Circuit’s creation and use of the actual disruption test in the public 
school context.12  Part II considers lower courts’ applications of—and 
                                                 
 8. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 749; Burnside, 363 F.2d at 744; see Consolidated Brief for 
Appellees at 1, Burnside, 363 F.2d 744, Blackwell, 363 F.2d 749 (Nos. 22,681, 22,712) 
(noting that the Fifth Circuit granted Appellants’ Motion To Consolidate on Appeal 
on August 9, 1965). 
 9. See Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748 (finding students’ non-disruptive behavior did 
not warrant the exclusion of “freedom buttons” from the school); Blackwell, 363 F.2d 
at 753 (finding students’ behavior disruptive and protecting the school’s interest in 
prohibiting such behavior). 
 10. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 541–55 (5th 
ed. 2004) (1970) (discussing racial protest and the courts’ reaction to such protests 
during the Civil Rights Movement); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (2006) (noting that “[r]ules operate 
in cultural contexts, and a careful observer should never lose sight of this fact” in a 
discussion of the risks and potential rewards of comparative legal scholarship).  See 
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, at xii–xiii (2002), for a 
discussion of the link between legal rights and social practices. 
 11. My research in the legal literature reveals a lack of in-depth examination of 
either Burnside or Blackwell.  Both are, of course, cited regularly as part of citations to 
Tinker.  A notable exception is ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP:  THE UNINTENDED 
COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009). 
 12. Understanding more about the context of cases and the actors involved can 
“provide a rich background against which to understand the cases,” “reflect the 
primal force of politics” and “generate a better understanding of the cases 
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retreat from—this actual disruption test in the student speech 
context, and analyzes the presence of Burnside and Blackwell in the 
Tinker district court opinion and in various drafts of the Tinker 
Supreme Court opinion.  Struggles for students’ speech rights and 
battles waged by the Civil Rights Movement rarely are seen as 
intertwined strands of history, but this Article demonstrates that the 
student free speech rights articulated in Tinker are built upon the 
struggles of the Civil Rights Movement. 
I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S ACTUAL DISRUPTION TEST 
The facts giving rise to Burnside and Blackwell occurred in a political 
and social context that may today seem alien to most Americans, 
especially those under the age of fifty.  For many reasons, students’ 
advocacy of voting rights in 1964 and 1965 in Mississippi had the 
potential to be highly volatile.  Brown v. Board of Education13 had been 
decided only a decade earlier.14  Southern support for segregation 
                                                                                                                 
themselves.”  CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 1 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds., 
Foundation Press 2008).  The “relationship between legal pronouncements and 
social and political realities . . . is rarely direct.  Indeed, many of the great civil rights 
‘victories’ may contain less than meets the eye.”  Id.; see also Patricia Ewick & Susan S. 
Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales:  Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 197, 199 (1995) (discussing the virtues of narratives); Reginald Oh, Re-
Mapping Equal Protection Jurisprudence:  A Legal Geography of Race and Affirmative Action, 
53 AM. U. L. REV. 1305, 1311–13, 1316, 1359 (2004) (examining the significance of 
legal narratives and how they impact constructions of social reality). 
 13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 14. In 1954, the Supreme Court declared de jure school segregation 
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).  One year 
later, when Brown was again before the Court, it held that school segregation by law 
should be brought to an end “with all deliberate speed.”  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (considering the manner in which relief must be accorded 
to the parties under its previous ruling).  Government officials’ and community 
leaders’ reactions to Brown I and Brown II were intense, especially across the South.  
Nineteen U.S. Senators signed the Southern Manifesto, a statement that described 
Brown as an “unwarranted exercise of power by the Court” and “commend[ed] the 
motives of those States which have declared the intention to resist forced integration 
by any lawful means.”  102 CONG. REC. 4255, 4460 (1956).  Similarly, during a brief 
special session requested by Governor George Wallace, the Alabama legislature 
unanimously approved a resolution calling for a federal constitutional convention 
with the purpose of limiting the authority of the federal government over public 
elementary and secondary schools.  Solons Back Wallace on School Plan, CLARION-
LEDGER, Sept. 22, 1964, at 1A.  An editorial from the Jackson, Mississippi Daily News 
warned: 
Human blood may stain Southern soil in many places because of this 
decision but the dark red stains of that blood will be on the marble steps of 
the United States Supreme Court building.  White and Negro children in the 
same schools will lead to miscegenation.  Miscegenation leads to mixed 
marriages and mixed marriages lead to mongrelization of the human race. 
Immediate Reaction to the Decision, Brown v. Board of Education, Landmark 
Supreme Court Cases, http://www.landmarkcases.org/brown/reaction.html (last 
visited March 31, 2009) (quoting Editorial, Bloodstains on White Marble Steps, DAILY 
NEWS (Jackson, Miss.), May 18, 1954).  See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
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remained so strong that the first public elementary and secondary 
schools in Mississippi were not integrated until 1964, and even then 
all integration statewide involved a total of only sixty African-
American students attending White schools in four different 
districts.15  Federal troops were required to protect nine African-
American students as they integrated the nearby Little Rock, 
Arkansas Central High School in 1957,16 and federal marshals were 
needed to quell hundreds of rioters on the University of Mississippi 
(“Ole Miss”) campus in fall 1962 when James Meredith became the 
first African-American student to enroll at the state’s flagship public 
university.17  In June 1963, Mississippi NAACP leader Medgar Evers 
was murdered outside his home in Jackson, Mississippi.18  Two 
months later Martin Luther King, Jr., gave his “I Have a Dream” 
speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.19  Crosses still were 
burned on occasion in Mississippi.20  And all across the Deep South, 
restaurant sit-ins, boycotts of businesses and public services such as 
transportation systems, and other protests disputing the systems and 
practices of racial discrimination disrupted business as usual.21  In C. 
Vann Woodward’s words, African-Americans “were in charge of their 
own movement now, and youth was in the vanguard.”22 
                                                                                                                 
JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (rev. ed. 2004) (1975), for a comprehensive history of Brown. 
 15. Desegregation Has Increased in Dixie, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 4, 1964, at 12A.  
Tom Brady, a Mississippi trial court judge, wrote Black Monday, described by John 
Hope Franklin as “a bitter tirade against [Brown] . . . arguing that blacks were not 
capable of becoming equal citizens.”  JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., 
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:  A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 492 (7th ed. 1994) 
(1953).  The slow rate of desegregation was hardly unique to Mississippi.  Charles 
Ogletree notes that “[b]y 1964, only one-fiftieth of all southern black children 
attended integrated schools.”  CHARLES OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:  
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 128 (2004). 
 16. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 129. 
 17. WILLIAM DOYLE, AN AMERICAN INSURRECTION:  THE BATTLE OF OXFORD, 
MISSISSIPPI, 1962, at 74–76 (2001).  Considering the level of hysteria and violence at 
these riots, it is miraculous that only two people died there and one or both may 
have been killed by a stray bullet. 
 18. Martha Neil, 45 Years After Medgar Evers’ Murder, His Work Continues, A.B.A. J., 
June 12, 2008, http://abajournal.com/news/45_years_after_medgar_evers_murder 
_his_work_continues.  A few months later in November 1963, President John F. 
Kennedy was assassinated in Houston, Texas.  John Solomon, Scientists Cast Doubt on 
Kennedy Bullet Analysis, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at A3. 
 19. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM:  WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD 102–06 (James Melvin Washington, ed., Harper San Francisco 
1992). 
 20. See Four Crosses Are Burned at Pascagoula, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 26, 1964, at 
3A.  Pascagoula, Mississippi, is on the Gulf Coast. 
 21. See generally BELL, supra note 10, at 541–55 (discussing protest activities 
occurring during the Civil Rights Movement). 
 22. WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 170. 
  
1134 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1129 
A.  Burnside v. Byars in the District Court:  Students Wearing Voting 
Rights Buttons Create a “Disturbance” 
Controversy and violence erupted in many local communities when 
civil rights advocates sought to register African-Americans to vote or 
demonstrated public support for such initiatives. During the summer 
of 1964, the Council of Federated Organizations (“COFO”) 
documented over 1000 arrests, 65 bombings or burning of buildings, 
and at least 6 murders in retaliation for civil rights activism.23  In 
Philadelphia, Mississippi these struggles occurred in the streets and 
in the schools. 
In summer 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil 
Rights Act into law.24  During what became known as “Freedom 
Summer,” COFO mobilized hundreds of civil rights volunteers from 
the North, mostly Whites, to register African-American voters 
throughout the South.25  The number of registered African-American 
voters in this region nearly doubled between 1960 (1.1 million) and 
1964 (more than two million).26  Many volunteers became targets of 
the massive resistance led by factions of the local White community.  
One of these incidents was memorialized decades later in the movie 
“Mississippi Burning”27:  on June 21, 1964, three Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”) volunteers—Michael Schwerner, 
Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney—were arrested for speeding 
while in Philadelphia, Mississippi to visit the site of an African-
American church that had been burned to the ground.28  After being 
released from jail that evening, the three young men disappeared.29  
Almost six weeks later, their mutilated, decaying bodies were found 
by FBI agents in a newly-constructed earthen dam near 
Philadelphia.30  All three young men had been shot.31  The FBI’s 
investigation of these murders would take several months, involve 258 
                                                 
 23. See id. at 184 (disclosing the casualty statistics that resulted from the 
Mississippi Summer Project). 
 24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
 25. Inventory of the Ruth Schein/1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project 
Collection, http://www.nypl.org/research/manuscripts/scm/scmgmfsp.xml (last 
visited April 2, 2009). 
 26. Strong Negro Vote Big Aid to Lyndon, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 27, 1964, at 1A. 
 27. See Rita Kempley, ‘Burning’:  Potent but Problematic, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1988, 
at C1 (reviewing the plot and cast of “Mississippi Burning”). 
 28. Mike Smith, Federal, State Grand Juries Push CR Murder Inquiries, CLARION-
LEDGER, Sept. 23, 1964, at 1A.  Schwerner, age twenty-four, and Goodman, age 
twenty, were both White and from New York.  Id.  Chaney, age twenty-one, was 
African-American and from nearby Meridian, Mississippi.  Id. 
 29. Grand Jury Continuing in Biloxi, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 24, 1964, at 1A. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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federal agents, and cost nearly $770 thousand—an expense amplified 
because of local obstruction of the investigation.32  Several of the 
twenty-one men eventually indicted by the federal grand jury in 
connection with the murders were local law enforcement officials, 
including the county sheriff.33 
About six weeks after the bodies of Chaney, Schwerner, and 
Goodman were found, the African-American principal of the 
segregated, African-American high school in nearby Philadelphia 
learned that “a number” of students were wearing buttons at his 
school bearing the words “One Man One Vote” and “SNCC.”34  The 
principal announced that these buttons could not be worn at school 
because the buttons “didn’t have any bearing on [the students’] 
education, would cause commotion, and would be disturbing [to] the 
school program by taking up time trying to get order, passing them 
around and discussing them in the classroom and explaining to the 
next child why they are wearing them.”35  Soon thereafter, on 
Monday, September 21, 1964, three or four students wore SNCC 
buttons at school and were sent home when they refused to remove 
them.36  The next day, the students returned to school without the 
buttons.37  Then, on Thursday, September 24, a larger demonstration 
took place involving thirty to forty students wearing SNCC buttons; a 
teacher described this event as causing “a commotion.”38  The main 
newspaper in the state, Jackson’s Clarion-Ledger, reported that “some 
50 [students were] suspended” as a result of wearing these buttons.39 
Previously, students had worn buttons referring to the Beatles and 
to their own romantic relationships (“His” and “Hers”).40  
Nonetheless, when the students were disciplined for wearing the 
SNCC buttons, the principal’s letter to the parents stated “‘[i]t is 
                                                 
 32. FBI Director Tells Expense of Neshoba Murder Probe, CLARION-LEDGER, May 18, 
1965, at 1A. 
 33. William L. Chaze, Federals Won’t Cooperate:  No Indictments in Neshoba, CLARION-
LEDGER, Feb. 5, 1965, at 1A.  With this background, it may not seem surprising that 
the federal investigators were instructed to not share information with local officials 
until the federal prosecutions had finished, even when the Neshoba County grand 
jury subpoenaed FBI officials.  Katzenbach Believes Data Will Result in Indictments, 
CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 28, 1964, at 1A.  The Neshoba County grand jury did not 
issue any indictments and placed blame for its lack of indictments at the feet of the 
“federals” due to their failure to share information.  Chaze, supra. 
 34. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 35. Id. at 746–47 (internal formatting omitted). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 747. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sue for School Button-Wearing Permit in State, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 2, 1964, at 
1B. 
 40. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746 n.2. 
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against the school policy for anything to be brought into the school 
that is not educational.’”41  Although the principal’s statement clearly 
was an inaccurate reflection of school policy, it is difficult to see how 
he—an African-American in Philadelphia, Mississippi—could have 
acted otherwise.  If he had permitted a substantial number of African-
American students to wear SNCC buttons in school, the reaction 
from the African-American community probably would have been 
privately mixed, but publicly quiet.  And, the White community likely 
would have reacted with hostility at best and violence visited upon the 
principal and his family at worst.42  The state of Mississippi still funded 
White supremacist organizations, and clearly law enforcement in the 
Philadelphia area was no friend to African-Americans.43 
Yet despite the risks of retaliation from the White community and a 
potentially hostile judiciary, two African-American parents filed suit 
on September 25, 1964 on behalf of their children and the class of 
affected children, seeking to overturn the suspensions as resulting 
from an unconstitutional policy.44  The Complaint alleged that the 
principal suspended the students pursuant to a school board policy 
“which provides for the expulsion and/or suspension of all students 
who display freedom insignia upon their clothing” and that the 
suspensions violated the students’ First Amendment speech rights as 
well as their Fifth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendment rights.45 The handwritten notes of the district court 
judge suggest that he viewed the complaint as alleging racial 
discrimination—a charge for which he saw no supporting evidence.46  
On October 21 of the same year the district court, the Honorable 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 747 n.4. 
 42. See KLUGER, supra note 14, at 300–01 (noting that a White federal district 
court judge who found in favor of plaintiffs in a voting rights case was subjected to 
“vicious mail” and “obscene phone calls,” and that “[o]n the street, the whites cut 
him dead,” “[y]oungsters taunted his wife, and grown-ups would occasionally block 
her passage,” “[s]omeone planted a flaming cross on [his] lawn,”  and  concrete was 
thrown at his home); id. at 381 (describing White school administrators’ control over 
African-American teachers); id. at 394 (discussing the lack of support for the filing of 
Brown among the African-American community in Topeka); id. at 396 (indicating 
that “white anger the suit would likely arouse”); see also WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 
vi (describing African-Americans’ ambivalence towards civil rights struggles). 
 43. See WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 173 (“[Mississippi’s] Negroes lived in 
constant fear and its whites under rigid conformity to dogmas of white supremacy as 
interpreted by a state-subsidized Citizens Council.”). 
 44. Sue for School Button-Wearing Permit in State, supra note 39. 
 45. Complaint at 2, Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 1964) 
(order denying preliminary injunction), rev’d, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).  The 
United Press International described the complaint as initiating a free speech case.  
Sue for School Button-Wearing Permit in State, supra note 39. 
 46. Handwritten notes of Judge Mize, Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. 
Miss. Oct. 14, 1964). 
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Sidney Mize presiding,47 heard plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary 
restraining order as well as a preliminary injunction and denied 
both.48  Judge Mize delivered an oral opinion from the bench on that 
day, finding that the buttons had created a disturbance, the 
restriction of the buttons was reasonable, and the restriction was 
“reasonably necessary to maintain proper discipline in the school.”49  
The order denying the preliminary injunction was entered into the 
record a few weeks later.50 
The day after the district court opinion was issued, the news was 
first-page, above-the-fold in the Clarion-Ledger.51  The headline read 
“Philly School Upheld In Federal Court Here:  May Forbid Students 
With Freedom Buttons.”52  Despite the region’s White hostility to the 
Civil Rights Movement, the article was an example of standard 
professional journalism, presenting a fairly neutral recounting of the 
facts of the dispute and the court’s opinion.53 
B. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education in the District 
Court:  Students’ Voting Rights Button-Wearing and Accompanying Action Is 
“Insubordinate” 
Civil rights activism and accompanying controversy in Mississippi 
was not confined either to the town of Philadelphia or to its schools.  
Around the same time as the three civil rights workers’ murder near 
Philadelphia, at least fifteen bombings related to “racial tensions” 
                                                 
 47. The federal district court judge, the Honorable Sidney Mize, who ordered 
James Meredith admitted to “Ole Miss” (under the direction of the Fifth Circuit on 
remand), ordered three of the four integrated school districts to admit African-
American students into White schools and decided one of the civil rights student 
speech cases, Burnside v. Byars.  Before his tenure on the federal bench, Judge Mize 
had served on the local school board for eight years.  Mize Funeral Set Tuesday, 
CLARION-LEDGER, Apr. 27, 1965, at 1A.  Interestingly, Judge Mize’s hostility to 
integration was well-known and documented in at least one of his judicial opinions.  
See Thomas Jackson, The Fight Against Integration, AM. RENAISSANCE, Mar. 2006, at 7 
(recalling Judge Mize’s negative reaction to the Supreme Court’s stance in favor of 
integration). 
 48. Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 1964) (order denying 
preliminary injunction), rev’d, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 49. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 8.  Neither the district court 
archives nor the Fifth Circuit archives have any record of the oral opinion; aside 
from the quotations provided in the parties’ appellate briefs, it appears lost to 
history. 
 50. Burnside v. Byars, No. 1252(E)(C) (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 1964) (order denying 
preliminary injunction), rev’d, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 51. William Chaze, Philly School Upheld in Federal Court Here:  May Forbid Students 
with Freedom Buttons, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 9, 1964, at 1A. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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occurred in McComb, a small town in southwestern Mississippi.54  
Across the state, thirty-six African-American churches were bombed 
or burned during 1964.55  During October 1964, eighteen 
congressmen wrote an open letter to the President expressing grave 
concern about the political climate in the Deep South.  The AP 
described the letter as communicating that “law and order in 
Mississippi have broken down in a wave of violence, terror and 
intimidation.”56  The letter said, “[t]here is no protection afforded 
those engaged in civil rights activity,’” and called for “a massive 
permanent increase” in the number of FBI agents assigned to the 
area as well as a federal grand jury to investigate “the possible 
connections between law enforcement officials and the bombings 
and other acts of violence in southwest Mississippi.”57 
About 150 miles north of the McComb area devastated by 
bombings, Rolling Fork, Mississippi was another community in which 
African-American students wore SNCC voting rights buttons to their 
segregated, African-American public high school.  The Rolling Fork 
students had worn these buttons previously without comment,58 but 
on Friday, January 29, 1965, the principal asked some of the students 
to remove their buttons toward the end of the day after he became 
aware they were talking loudly in the hallway during class time, 
presumably about the buttons.59  The weekend passed and about 150 
students wore SNCC buttons to school on Monday, February 1.60  
Some of these students also distributed buttons in the hallway and 
pinned buttons on their classmates—activities reportedly resulting in 
“a general breakdown of orderly discipline.”61  The principal 
                                                 
 54. William L. Chaze, McComb’s Mob, Bombings like Bus Line, Puzzling, CLARION-
LEDGER, Sept. 27, 1964, at 3D.  An incident in late September, 1964 was typical:  an 
African-American family’s home was bombed and in response, a group of African-
Americans gathered at the site, described in the Clarion-Ledger as “a mob that easily 
could have developed into a riot” and “a milling, angry crowd of about 300 Negroes.”  
Id.  The local authorities attempted to disperse the mob and made numerous arrests.  
Id.  U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach remarked “[t]here have been a 
number of bombings.  Negro homes have been bombed and then Negroes have 
been arrested, creating a very dangerous situation.”  Katzenbach Believes Data Will 
Result in Indictments, supra note 33. 
 55. Austin Scott, No Clear-Cut Wins Seen for CR Cases, CLARION-LEDGER, May 17, 
1965, at 5A. 
 56. Congressmen Ask Federal Action for Mississippi, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 6, 1964, at 
3A. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Consolidated Brief of Appellants on Appeal at 6, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 
744 (5th Cir. 1966), Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th 
Cir. 1966) (Nos. 22,681, 22,712). 
 59. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 750–51 (5th Cir. 
1966); Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 60. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751–52. 
 61. Id. at 751. 
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informed the students they could not wear the buttons at school 
because the students and their buttons “were creating such confusion 
in the classrooms and in the corridor.”62  (Also on February 1, almost 
300 miles to the northeast, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and nearly 300 
marchers in Selma, Alabama were arrested and jailed because of their 
nonviolent protest of Selma’s refusal to register African-American 
voters.)63 
The next day, Tuesday, February 2, nearly 200 students64 wore 
SNCC buttons to school in Rolling Fork and were again informed 
that they could not wear the buttons in school.65  The day after that, 
127 students66 wore the buttons to school and those who declined to 
take off the buttons were summarily suspended for not following 
school rules.67  Before driving the suspended students home, a bus 
driver went into the school building and started handing out a box 
full of SNCC buttons, at one point entering a classroom where class 
was in session.68  At the same time, some students threw buttons into 
the school through open windows and others tried to pin buttons on 
their classmates.69  More students were suspended for wearing SNCC 
buttons in the days that followed.70  About three weeks later, around 
300 students of all ages were still suspended, not attending school 
because the ban on SNCC buttons remained in place.71  At that point, 
the school district suspended them for the rest of the year.72  As in 
Burnside, the principal of this African-American high school was 
African-American himself, and like the principal in Burnside, this 
                                                 
 62. Id. at 751, 751 n.3 . 
 63. The nearly fifty children who participated in this march on February 1 and 
carried “freedom signs” were taken into custody but not charged.  Selma Arrest of King 
Part of CR Drive Plan:  Also Will Seek Seating in Alabama Legislature, CLARION-LEDGER, 
Feb. 2, 1965, at 1A.  The following day, hundreds more marched in the streets of 
Selma to protest Dr. King’s arrest.  Several hundred of these were students absent 
from school for the purpose of protesting; local law enforcement agents took the 
students into custody and charged them with juvenile delinquency.  Hundreds Arrested 
in Voter Campaign, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 3, 1965, at 1A.  More than 2000 African-
Americans were taken into custody over the course of a few days in Selma.  President 
Indignant over Voting Denials, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 5, 1965, at 1A. 
Dr. King was a notable figure by 1965, having only the prior year become the 
youngest person ever honored with a Nobel Peace Prize.  OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 
138–39. 
 64. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 7. 
 65. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751; Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra 
note 58, at 7. 
 66. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 7. 
 67. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 751. 
 68. Id. at 752. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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principal likely faced potentially violent retaliation from the local 
White community if he was seen as nurturing support for voting 
rights, especially among impressionable children. 
Several days later on April 1, 1965, a small group of Rolling Fork, 
Mississippi parents represented by the NAACP filed suit.73  They 
contested the suspension of their children for wearing SNCC buttons, 
disputed the segregation of the school system, and sought a 
preliminary injunction on both counts.74  The district court did not 
hear the preliminary injunction motion until May 10.  The next day, 
it denied the motion as it applied to the 125 then-still-suspended 
students.75  The two-page opinion identified the issue squarely as a 
disciplinary problem: 
[T]he children seek to defy the school authorities and ignore their 
instructions and be given a decisive voice in the management of 
the school.  That is not and never has been the law and will never 
be even good common sense so long as public schools continue to 
merit their cost of operation.76 
The district court determined that the school rule was not 
“unreasonable or oppressive” and emphasized the importance of 
courts deferring to school authorities in student discipline matters.77  
It did not decide the case based on the disruption created but on the 
“insubordination” of violating a rule.78  Thus, the students’ 
disobedience was the district court’s focus, whether that disobedience 
had negatively affected the school environment or not.  Students’ 
ability to engage in non-disruptive speech about some of the most 
important political issues of the day remained at the school’s mercy.  
Interestingly, two days after issuing that decision upholding the 
school’s disciplinary decisions, the district court granted plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction regarding the other claim in the 
case, thus enjoining the system of de jure school segregation in 
Rolling Fork.79 
                                                 
 73. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 9. 
 74. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 75. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., No. 1096(W), slip op. at 1 (S.D. 
Miss. May 11, 1965), aff’d, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Consolidated Brief for 
Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 10.  The record does not explain the 
discrepancy between the numbers of students suspended for the duration of the 
school year:  125 or 300.  Presumably some students were allowed to return to school 
without their SNCC buttons. 
 76. Blackwell, No. 1096(W), slip op. at 2. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 10.  Although the district 
court’s decision in Burnside upholding the school’s right to restrict students from 
wearing SNCC buttons made front-page, above-the-fold news in the Clarion-Ledger, 
news about the filing of Blackwell and the district court’s denial of the preliminary 
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During this time, the broader Civil Rights Movement continued to 
make progress, but not without meeting wild resistance in the streets 
which made the use of school authority to suppress students’ clamor 
for civil rights look almost de minimis by contrast.  On March 7, 1965, 
Alabama police used billy clubs, tear gas, and nightsticks to injure 
more than 600 unarmed voting rights marchers as they marched in 
Selma, Alabama; this event was later to become known as “Bloody 
Sunday.”80  Eighteen days later, Dr. King and hundreds of other 
protesters completed what should have been a four-day march from 
Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery.81 
C. The Fifth Circuit:  Burnside and Blackwell Consolidated 
In both Burnside and Blackwell, plaintiffs appealed the district 
courts’ denial of injunctive relief.  Because the cases presented the 
same legal issue, the Fifth Circuit granted plaintiffs’ motion to 
consolidate the two cases.82  Thus, the two appeals were briefed and 
argued together, and decided by the same panel. 
1. The actual disruption test emerges:  one case affirmed, one case reversed 
On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, the students presented two 
arguments contending the district courts committed reversible error.  
First, the students argued that the district court did not consider their 
free speech rights when evaluating whether the schools’ regulations 
were reasonable.83  Second, they contended that student speech could 
only be restricted under the clear and present danger test, which had 
not been satisfied in either case.84  By contrast, the school districts 
rejected the notion that the students had any free speech rights in 
public schools whatsoever and instead framed the issue as merely “a 
matter dealing with the question of reasonableness of school 
authorities in maintaining proper discipline within the school.”85  The 
parties’ arguments framed the clash between the old approach and 
                                                                                                                 
injunction was absent from that same paper.  Review by author of the Clarion Ledger 
Feb. 1–5, 1965; Apr. 23–27, 1965; May 11–19, 1965. 
 80. Letter from a Birmingham Jail (April 16, 1963), in KING, supra note 19, at 83; 
We Shall Overcome—Selma-to-Montgomery March, http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/ 
civilrights/al4.htm (last visited April 2, 2009). 
 81. We Shall Overcome—Selma-to-Montgomery March, supra note 80. 
 82. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 
1966); see also Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that the 
two cases had been consolidated for briefing and presentation).  This consolidation 
increased judicial efficiency and also made it easier for the NAACP to provide legal 
support in both cases. 
 83. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 11. 
 84. Id. at 16. 
 85. Consolidated Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 8. 
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the new, between students as obedient subjects of the school who 
could be disciplined for insubordination regardless of the validity of 
the rule they were violating, and students as citizens in a political 
body, entitled to limited protection for their peaceful protest and 
legitimate dissent even within the schoolhouse gates. 
With these cases, the Fifth Circuit was entering new territory.  The 
Supreme Court had held in 1943 in West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette86 that students could not be required to participate in the flag 
salute in public schools.  The analysis in Barnette, however, was 
convoluted and the Court did not make clear in its opinion whether 
Barnette was a free speech case, a free exercise case, some sort of 
political establishment case, or whether it fit into multiple 
categories.87  Furthermore, Barnette involved a student’s right to 
refrain from engaging in compelled speech, quite a different 
question from the freedom to affirmatively express one’s own possibly 
controversial opinions.88  Regardless of these limitations, though, 
Barnette did provide authority for the limited proposition that 
elementary and secondary students could be constitutional rights-
holders, a disputed issue at that point in time.89 
                                                 
 86. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 87. See Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students’ Religious Speech and Viewpoint 
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 197 (2007) (noting that Barnette was decided 
without use of clear test); Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 341–42 n.56 (2008) (arguing deductively that Barnette was a 
free speech case even though “the Court did not expressly ground its decision in the 
Free Speech Clause”); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) 
(describing Barnette as “decided exclusively upon free speech grounds” despite 
absence of explicit free exercise analysis), superseded in part by statute, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).  The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act did not disturb Smith's characterization of Barnette, rather it 
reinstated the "compelling interest test" to determine whether a law ostensibly 
neutral on religion nevertheless imposes a substantial burden on a person's exercise 
of religion.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141 
 88. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631–34.  An Arizona district court applied Barnette in a 
case involving Jehovah’s Witness children who declined to stand for the singing of 
the national anthem and were suspended for insubordination.  But, the district court 
went further than merely applying Barnette; it overturned the suspensions in part 
because “it appears that the conduct of the pupils involved here was not disorderly 
and did not materially disrupt the conduct and discipline of the school, and since 
there is a lack of substantial evidence that it will do so in the future.”  Sheldon v. 
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963).  The test in this case may have 
influenced the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Blackwell and Burnside, but it was not cited 
in either decision.   
See also Theodore F. Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 
FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 41, n.39 (1969) (describing Barnette as a situation involving a 
“very limited sectarian interest” in contrast with “the right of the ‘general’ student” in 
Tinker). 
 89. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the 
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures . . . . These have, of course, 
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not 
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.  That they are educating the young for 
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Thus laying in place an important and controversial premise,90 the 
Fifth Circuit agreed with the students’ foundational claim that they 
held First Amendment affirmative speech rights in public schools.91  
The Fifth Circuit then moved quickly to limit the scope of those 
rights, turning to two non-student Supreme Court cases to support 
the claim that free speech rights “can be abridged by state officials if 
their protection of legitimate state interests necessitates [such] an 
invasion.”92  The Fifth Circuit also set forth basic principles for 
analyzing the validity of a restriction on students’ speech:  “The 
interests which the regulation seeks to protect must be fundamental 
and substantial if there is to be a restriction of speech”93 and the state 
has “a legitimate and substantial interest in the orderly conduct of 
the school.”94 
Turning to the specific speech in Burnside and Blackwell, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that merely wearing a political button was not 
“inherently distract[ing]” speech inclined to “break down the 
regimentation of the classroom such as carrying banners, scattering 
leaflets, [or] speechmaking.”95  Furthermore, in Burnside, because the 
other students in the school expressed only “mild curiosity” in the 
SNCC buttons, prohibiting the buttons was not necessary to maintain 
order.  Thus, the speech restriction in Burnside was “arbitrary and 
unreasonable,” an unjustifiable infringement on the students’ First 
Amendment rights.96  Making clear the factual distinction between 
Burnside and Blackwell, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that “the mere 
presence of ‘freedom buttons’ is [not] calculated to cause a 
disturbance sufficient to warrant their exclusion from school 
premises unless there is some student misconduct involved.”97 
                                                                                                                 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”). 
 90. Denno, supra note 88, at 36 (stating, “[i]t is reasonable to assert that prior to 
the Tinker decision the primary freedom in public schools had been that of 
administrators from judicial interference”). 
 91. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 747–48 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 92. Id. at 748 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 510 (1951), and Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)). 
 93. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 
1966). 
 94. See id. (emphasizing that “[t]he proper operation of public school systems is 
one of the highest and most fundamental responsibilities of the state”).  Further, in 
Burnside, the court defined the state interest as “maintaining an educational system.”  
Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748. 
 95. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748. 
 96. Id.  As such, the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 748–49. 
 97. Id. at 748. 
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It was this factual distinction that would allow the Fifth Circuit to 
reach opposite outcomes in these two cases.  Accordingly, in Blackwell, 
the Fifth Circuit looked to the students’ conduct in aggressively 
distributing the buttons as the source of “a complete breakdown in 
school discipline.”98  The court emphasized the need for schools to be 
able to discipline “the distribution, pinning, and throwing of 
buttons,” the “discourteous remarks to school personnel,” “the 
deliberate absence of a student from class,” and the “loud 
conversation in halls and corridors which c[ould] be heard in 
classrooms.”99  Only because the students’ conduct was “so inexorably 
tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable” did 
the Fifth Circuit determine that the prohibition of the buttons, and 
thereby the message, was reasonable and the limitation of the 
students’ First Amendment rights constitutional.100  Yet, even while 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the schools’ actions in Blackwell, it cautioned 
school officials to “be careful in their monitoring of student 
expression in circumstances in which such expression does not 
substantially interfere with the operation of the school.”101  Consistent 
with Burnside, nowhere in Blackwell did the Fifth Circuit hold that a 
school must be able to prohibit the mere wearing of a button—even a 
civil rights button worn in the Deep South during the mid-1960s.102  
Derrick Bell’s description of the social context emphasizes the radical 
nature of the Fifth Circuit’s approach:  “From the viewpoint of a great 
many Whites, there really were no peaceful, nondisruptive civil rights 
protests.  Each represented a most threatening challenge to an 
important aspect of the local status quo.”103 
2. Noteworthy aspects of these two cases and their context 
Before turning to the cases that incorporated Burnside and Blackwell 
in the few years after they were issued, three aspects of these two cases 
deserve mention.  First, the closest the Fifth Circuit came to 
considering the disruptive potential of other students’ reactions to 
the specific message expressed by the speakers was the court’s explicit 
references to “freedom buttons” in Burnside and Blackwell.  In 
hindsight, the buttons’ disruptive potential seems much greater than 
                                                 
 98. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 753. 
 99. Id.  These were the disruptive activities, the “unusual degree of commotion, 
boisterous conduct, a collision with the rights of others, an undermining of 
authority, and a lack of order, discipline and decorum.”  Id. at 754. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 753. 
 103. BELL, supra note 10, at 555. 
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the court implied:  in Burnside, African-American students were 
wearing voting rights buttons in a community where the murdered 
bodies of three voting rights workers had been unearthed six weeks 
earlier—after the murders were covered up by White local law 
enforcement officials.104  Furthermore, the bombings and other race-
motivated violence across the state of Mississippi at that time make 
clear that those three murders were not isolated incidents of racial 
violence and the community out of which Blackwell arose presumably 
was racially charged as well.105  Perhaps the court considered the 
disruptive potential lessened somewhat because the schools were 
entirely segregated, and while that might have reduced the potential 
for immediate disruption, it could not negate it entirely—it would be 
impossible to completely isolate the students, teachers, and principal 
from the unstable and explosive racial context in which they lived. 
But more importantly in a precedential sense, the Fifth Circuit’s 
lack of emphasis on the disruptive potential of the specific message 
led to a stronger focus on the time, place, and manner of the conduct 
alone.  Because Tinker did not adopt that same focus, the decision in 
Tinker led to a series of difficult and problematic questions including 
uncertainty about how student speech restrictions square with the 
First Amendment’s general presumption against viewpoint 
discrimination,106 and the role of the so-called heckler’s veto in 
assessing the level of actual or anticipated disruption.107  Indeed, it 
was the presence of disruptive conduct by the speakers themselves in 
Blackwell but not Burnside that led the Fifth Circuit to different 
conclusions in these two cases—not the message itself or the 
responsive speech or conduct of others. 
                                                 
 104. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Bowman, supra note 87, at 202, for a discussion of these issues.  See also id. 
(stating that “the focus of . . . [Tinker’s] disruption test and the Court’s subsequent 
language clarifying that test are consistent with the idea that one particular 
perspective could cause a level and type of disruption sufficient to justify quashing it 
in what would amount to viewpoint discrimination”); John Taylor, Why Student 
Religious Speech Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 234 (2007) (arguing that Tinker does 
not require regulation on students’ speeches to have “viewpoint-neutral effects”). 
 107. Berkman, supra note 3, at 591–92; Taylor, supra note 106, at 231; see also John 
Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1137909 
(“[F]orty years of applying Tinker have not made clear the degree to which Tinker 
allows schools to engage in a heckler’s veto, and the lack of a clear judicial 
commitment to the no-heckler’s-veto principle creates unacceptable high risks that 
schools may be engaging in purposeful viewpoint discrimination.”). 
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Second, aside from citing one another, Burnside and Blackwell 
relied on no other authority for the actual disruption test.108  The 
Fifth Circuit’s focus on conduct and actual disruption in these two 
cases could have been influenced by any number of cases or 
common-sense approaches.  Speculating about what the judges would 
have known or learned through their own research is difficult, but 
one area of law almost certainly familiar to the Fifth Circuit judges 
would have been the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in civil rights 
protest cases occurring in non-school settings within the Fifth 
Circuit’s boundaries.  Between December 1961 and February 1966 
the Supreme Court reversed convictions of four individuals charged 
with violating Louisiana’s breach of peace statute for activities the 
Court described as non-violent civil rights protests.109  In all four cases, 
the Court emphasized the non-disruptive nature of the protesters’ 
actions, by which it often seemed to mean non-violent.110  This 
approach was not new:  the Court had used disruption and violence 
as touchstones in other protest cases as well.111 
To the extent the Fifth Circuit understood Burnside and Blackwell as 
civil rights protest cases which happened to occur in schools, 
employing a focus on disruption would have been logical.  The two 
Fifth Circuit judges and the district court judge sitting by designation 
in Burnside and Blackwell also would have been aware of the Fifth 
Circuit’s intensely controversial decisions supporting voting rights 
and school desegregation, and the riots and violent protests staged in 
response to those decisions and their implementation.112  Compared 
                                                 
 108. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 
1966). 
 109. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 (1966) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 536 (1965), Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962), and Garner v. Louisiana, 
368 U.S. 157 (1961)). 
 110. See id. (“In each, the purpose of the participants was to protest the denial to 
Negroes of rights guaranteed them by state and federal constitutions and to petition 
their governments for redress of grievances.  In none was there evidence that the 
participants planned or intended disorder.  In none were there circumstances which 
might have led to a breach of the peace chargeable to the protesting participants.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235–36 (1963) (stating that 
petitioners had peacefully expressed their grievances); Cox, 379 U.S. at 549 
(reversing defendant’s conviction because students’ actions did not constitute a 
breach of peace, and thereby, students themselves were not violent).  By contrast, the 
Court was much less likely to even grant certiorari to, let alone reverse, cases with 
similar legal issues but with facts including disruption or disorder.  BELL, supra note 
10, at 549. 
 112. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 19 (Univ. Ala. Press 1990) (1981) (noting 
that civil rights cases comprised just less than three percent of the Fifth Circuit’s case 
load around this time, but these cases were some of the Circuit’s most high-profile).  
See generally supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text; infra Part (II)(A) (discussing 
the elementary, secondary, university-level school desegregation decisions).  The 
Fifth Circuit’s voting rights cases included Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 
  
2009] THE CIVIL RIGHTS ROOTS OF TINKER’S DISRUPTION TESTS 1147 
to the public reaction to some of those decisions, the practical 
consequences of allowing limited, silent, peaceful student speech 
about civil rights through Burnside and Blackwell’s actual disruption 
test must have seemed much less dramatic. 
Finally, the Clarion Ledger was generally aware of the Fifth Circuit’s 
activities and often covered its new decisions; on July 22, 1966, it 
reprinted an Associated Press story describing a Fifth Circuit decision 
issued the same day as Blackwell and Burnside holding “that Negroes 
must be represented on jury lists at least in proportion to their 
population.”113  Coverage of the Fifth Circuit’s opinions in the student 
speech cases was absent from Mississippi’s principal newspaper, 
however, which instead prominently featured a portrait of life in an 
unchanging South.  A photograph of two genteel White women who, 
the caption explains, are leading “the second annual Workshop for 
Dynamic Living,” captured approximately one-fourth of the front 
page the day after Blackwell and Burnside were decided.114 
Thus, the story of Burnside and Blackwell is not merely a tale of 
students who broke the school’s rules.  Rather, it is a story of African-
American students allied with their parents against the oppression of 
dominant White society in the form of the school, speaking out in the 
Deep South in pursuit of racial justice, seeking the rights accorded to 
citizens.  This is the legal and social foundation on which Tinker was 
built. 
                                                                                                                 
1966); United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Dogan, 314 
F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959), rev’d 
364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
Circuit Judge Gewin participated in fewer of these cases than most of his 
colleagues, and Circuit Judge Thornberry even less, but both of these judges who 
decided Burnside and Blackwell eventually became known as part of the Circuit’s 
“liberal wing” on school desegregation cases.  See BASS, supra note 112, at 160, 304 
(noting that “[Gewin] eventually joined in what became the liberal wing of the court 
in important school cases in the early 1970s” and that “Thornberry identified with 
the liberal bloc on the Fifth Circuit”).  Two years after deciding Burnside and 
Blackwell, Gewin wrote the Circuit’s en banc decision in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 
interpreting broadly the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  394 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 113. Jury List Must Include Names of Negro Citizens, CLARION-LEDGER, July 22, 1966, at 
1A. 
 114. Dynamic Living, CLARION-LEDGER, July 22, 1966, at 1A.  The caption is dwarfed 
by the accompanying picture of Mrs. J.H. Bowden and Miss Scott Young, who appear 
perched on the edge of a reflecting pool with their legs crossed demurely at the 
ankle.  Columns frame the pastoral background.  Id.  Specifically, the caption noted:  
“Miss Young, who will be a freshman music major at Belhaven [College] beginning in 
September . . . was among the top five beauties [at Murrah High School] and was 
selected most dignified and most talented in dramatics,” and Mrs. Bowden is “an 
assistant professor of speech at Belhaven.”  Id.; see also KLUGER, supra note 14, at 394 
(claiming that in Topeka, Kansas, and presumably elsewhere, newspapers “gave very 
little coverage to black affairs in general.”). 
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II. THE ROAD FROM “ACTUAL DISRUPTION” TO “SUBSTANTIAL AND 
MATERIAL DISRUPTION OR REASONABLE ANTICIPATION THEREOF” 
In Burnside and Blackwell the Fifth Circuit concluded that students 
held limited First Amendment free speech rights in schools and those 
rights could be curtailed if the students’ speech caused actual 
disruption of the educational environment.115  This test did not ask 
whether school officials had reasonably anticipated that speech about 
a certain issue would cause disruption when enacting a prior 
restraint-type of regulation (eventually, that consideration would be 
part of Tinker’s ultimate holding), but examined only the actual 
impact of the speech on the school environment with a focus on the 
speakers’ conduct.116  The actual disruption test affected the 
development of the law within the Fifth Circuit and beyond its 
borders; twelve cases nationwide cited Burnside and Blackwell before 
the Supreme Court decided Tinker in February 1969. 
Of those twelve cases, five arose out of public high schools and the 
remaining seven began in colleges or universities, where student 
protest already was a more common occurrence than in high 
schools.117  Many courts took liberties with the Fifth Circuit’s test, 
restricting its scope even as they purported to apply it, and others 
cited it for general principles such as the importance of deferring to 
school authorities, which was in fact not its primary focus.  Only 
rarely was the Fifth Circuit’s test applied in a manner true to the 
original.  In this nearly three-year window after the Burnside and 
Blackwell decisions and before Tinker, a mere two out of twelve cases 
overturned schools’ disciplinary decisions; both of those involved 
institutions of higher education. 
A. A Retreat from Actual Disruption in Secondary School Cases 
Throughout the 1960s, high school students were involved in civil 
rights protests across the South, some of which resulted in litigation 
challenging the arrest and conviction of protesters—but those 
protests rarely occurred on high school campuses.118  As a result of 
                                                 
 115. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 117. The following five cases were filed on behalf of students of public school:  
Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Brown 
v. Geer, 296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 
(N.D. Ill. 1968), rev’d, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970); Akin v. Bd. of Educ. Unified Sch. 
Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 118. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 229, 231 (1963) (discussing the involvement of high school students in 
protests in public spaces). 
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those circumstances and other factors,119 the body of reported pre-
Tinker high school student speech decisions is very small.  Of the five 
cases citing Burnside and Blackwell, three involved students’ violation 
of school rules regarding appearance, such as hairstyle or facial hair, 
one involved an underground newspaper, and the last was Tinker. 
Until the Supreme Court decided Tinker, all of the trial and appellate 
courts deciding these five cases upheld the discipline and quashed 
the students’ speech claims.  Then, in Tinker, the Supreme Court 
reversed the district and appellate courts’ decisions below.  Tinker 
also caused an appellate court to reverse one of the other four high 
school student speech cases. 
The Fifth Circuit was home to two cases in which male students 
were suspended or denied enrollment because of their “long” 
haircuts reminiscent of the Beatles’ shaggy coifs.  Not surprisingly, in 
both of those cases, Davis v. Firment120 and Ferrell v. Dallas Independent 
School District,121 courts purported to apply the circuit rule as stated in 
Burnside and Blackwell.122  Burnside and Blackwell were also employed as 
persuasive authority in a California state court case with similar facts, 
Akin v. Board of Education,123 in which a court upheld the suspension 
of a student for wearing a beard.124  Yet, in all three of these 
grooming-related cases, a school principal’s vague recollection of 
disruption when other students in previous years sported “long” hair 
or beards was sufficient to justify the existence and enforcement of 
the rule, regardless of any actual disruption resulting from the 
grooming choice in question.125  Despite their claimed reliance on the 
Burnside/Blackwell standard, these courts evaluated the 
reasonableness of the regulation not by the restrictive 
Burnside/Blackwell test of actual disruption, but rather by a test 
                                                 
 119. See supra notes 113–117 and accompanying text. 
 120. 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), aff’d, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 121. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 122. Davis, 269 F. Supp. at 527 (noting that the lower court in Davis cited only 
Burnside for the proposition that the disruption of the school environment justifies 
discipline).  The court also noted that a hairstyle does not constitute expression, and 
even if it did, it can be regulated by reasonable state rules.  Id.; see also Ferrell, 392 F.2d 
at 703 (citing both Burnside and Blackwell). 
 123. 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Ct. App. 1968). 
 124. Id. at 559.  Akin cites both Burnside and Blackwell for the actual disruption 
standard.  Id. at 562. 
 125. Davis, 269 F. Supp. at 528–29; see Ferrell, 392 F.2d at 699, 700–01 (observing 
that the principal’s opinion was “that the length and style of the boys’ hair would 
cause commotion, trouble, distraction and a disturbance in the school” based on past 
events at the school); Akin, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562–63 (holding that even though the 
student’s beard did not cause disruption at a private school, and another student 
wore a beard at a different public school without causing disruption, the principal’s 
recollection of past disruption was sufficient). 
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implicitly more in line with the one the Supreme Court eventually 
would employ in Tinker, focusing on whether disruption reasonably 
could be anticipated.126 
Burnside also was cited as persuasive authority in Scoville v. Board of 
Education of Joliet Township High School District 204,127 an Illinois case in 
which students circulated copies of a sixty-page underground 
newspaper/literary journal.128  The district court found that the 
journal was not disruptive but the school could prohibit its 
distribution on school grounds because the journal encouraged 
students to disobey school rules, employed “inappropriate and 
indecent language,”129 and criticized school policies as 
“propaganda”—all particularly undesirable actions inside the 
schoolhouse gate.130  So, despite not satisfying the Burnside/Blackwell 
test, the court held the newspaper could be prohibited for other 
reasons.131 
Finally, in Tinker—the case factually most similar to Burnside and 
Blackwell because of the students’ serious political speech—the 
district court also invoked the Burnside/Blackwell focus on disruption.  
However, it explicitly broadened the test to one in which schools also 
could prohibit student speech if school officials reasonably 
anticipated that the speech would cause such a disruption.132  As part 
of a larger organized protest effort, five students (three later became 
the Tinker plaintiffs) had worn black arm bands to school to protest 
                                                 
 126. See Akin, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 562–63 (examining experts’ opinions and 
concluding that it is possible that male students that grow beards could cause 
disruption in school).  More recently, some cases involving students’ hairstyles have 
been litigated as political or religious expression, but plaintiffs in those three early 
cases made no such claims. 
 127. 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev’d, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 128. Id. at 990. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 989–90, 992.  “[A]lthough we are in a period when the rights of the 
minor vis-à-vis the state are being closely reexamined, . . . the Supreme Court has 
recently affirmed the right of the state to protect its younger citizens from certain 
forms of speech which would, if the audience were adult, be protected by the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 992 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).  The Seventh Circuit reprinted the journal; although the 
journal was disrespectful of authority, it did not contain language that was obscene 
or an incitement to riot.  Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joliet Twp. High Sch. Dist. 204, 
425 F.2d 10, 13–14 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 131. Later, after the Supreme Court decided Tinker, the Seventh Circuit applied 
Tinker to reverse the district court’s decision in Scoville and overturn the student 
discipline.  Scoville, 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 132. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) 
(“[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led 
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact 
occurred.”). 
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the Vietnam War and call for a truce.133  The students and their 
parents knew this act would violate a newly enacted rule the school 
district instituted based on its concern about the escalating violence 
and confrontation of Vietnam protests and protest responses across 
the country.134  Before their suspension, the students were subjected 
to a few hostile remarks in school hallways, but those incidents 
seemed to be the limits of any actual disruption of the school 
environment caused by the armbands.135 
The district court in Tinker deferred to school officials’ expertise 
and set forth what it seemed to think was a fairly common-sense 
conclusion:  the topic of the Vietnam War was so controversial, and 
such a common focus of student protest in colleges and universities, 
that high school officials reasonably could expect that student speech 
opposing the war would cause a substantial or material disruption of 
the educational environment.136  It further concluded that the three 
student-plaintiffs’ black armbands fell into this category and, thus, 
their suspensions from school were not unconstitutional, despite the 
limited disruption caused by the armbands.137  Accordingly, the 
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim for which 
relief could be granted.138  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal 
by a divided panel, and then affirmed again in a summary opinion of 
the court en banc.139  It was not until Tinker reached the Supreme 
Court that the substantial and material disruption or reasonable 
                                                 
 133. Id. at 504. 
 134. Id. at 510 n.4. 
 135. Id. at 508.  According to the dissent, the students’ arm bands caused 
somewhat greater disruption and distraction in the schools, including evidence that a 
lesson in Mary Beth Tinker’s mathematics class was “wrecked” when she entered into 
class with the armband.  Id. at 517–18 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 136. Id. at 513 (majority opinion) (“When [the student] is in the cafeteria, or on 
the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, [the student] may 
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in 
Vietnam . . . .”); see Michael R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War:  The 
Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 81 (1998) (discussing the effects of the 
anti-Vietnam protest).  “[B]y the time anti-Vietnam activists began to mobilize, civil 
rights struggles in the South, as well as campaigns on behalf of other racial minorities 
and women, had habituated Americans to social protest, making it part of the 
cultural climate of the 1960s.  Bold willingness to question and resist the government 
was nothing new, nor were such dramatic techniques of protest as marching, sit-ins, 
picketing, civil disobedience, and provoking arrest.”  Id. 
 137. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972–73 (S.D. 
Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 138. See id. at 973 (holding that school’s regulation did not deprive plaintiff of 
constitutional right to freedom of speech, thus denying nominal damages and 
injunction against school). 
 139. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), 
rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
  
1152 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1129 
anticipation thereof tests for student speech became a definitive part 
of constitutional law.140 
Thus, in all five pre-Tinker high school student speech cases citing 
Burnside and Blackwell, including Tinker itself at the trial and appellate 
levels, the discipline was upheld.  Although these other courts 
purported to apply the Fifth Circuit’s actual disruption test, in reality 
their opinions bore much more similarity to the district court 
opinions in Burnside and Blackwell which considered students to be 
mere disobedient subjects.  Thus, the courts conveyed support for 
students’ free speech rights and students’ citizenship in principle, 
while continuing to grant great deference to schools, ultimately 
rejecting students’ actual claims.141 
B. Higher Education Begins To Emerge as Distinct from the 
Elementary/Secondary Context 
The five cases discussed above are part of a small but critical mass 
of cases brought in the late 1960s and early 1970s which started to 
establish a body of free speech case law applicable specifically to 
public high school students.  In the three years before Tinker, the 
Blackwell/Burnside rule also was invoked in seven cases arising out of 
higher education institutions—two more cases than those arising out 
of public secondary schools.  For the most part, the courts deciding 
the higher education cases were no more willing than the courts 
deciding the high school cases to overturn schools’ disciplinary 
decisions on the merits.  Thus, deference to educational institutions 
                                                 
 140. In the few years after Tinker was decided, courts and scholars debated 
whether Tinker had created a “reasonable anticipation” test because the plain 
language of the majority opinion did not explicitly say as much.  The Court never 
spoke on this matter again, but a consensus eventually emerged (whether based on 
judicial interpretation or practical necessity) that Tinker does stand for a reasonable 
anticipation test.  See, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 
965, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (concluding that student speech at issue “falls well short 
of the Tinker standard for reasonably anticipating a disruption of school activities”). 
 141. In Ferrell, a debate between the Fifth Circuit majority and a dissenting 
captured the essence of the controversy primed for the Supreme Court in Tinker.  
The majority wrote:  “The interest of the state in maintaining an effective and 
efficient school system is of paramount importance.  That which so interferes or 
hinders the state in providing the best education possible for its people, must be 
eliminated or circumscribed as needed.”  Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 
697, 703 (5th Cir. 1968).  Judge Tuttle, dissenting in Ferrell, wrote:  “[B]oth in . . . 
[Blackwell] and upon the record before us here, we find courts too prone to permit a 
curtailment of a constitutional right of a dissenter, because of the likelihood that it 
will bring disorder, resistance or improper and even violent action by those 
supporting the status quo.  It seems to me it cannot be said too often that the 
constitutional rights of an individual cannot be denied him because his exercise of 
them produces violent reaction by those who would deprive him of the very rights he 
seeks to assert.”  Id. at 705 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). 
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was common in both sets of cases, yet the college students’ protests 
arose out of a somewhat different history. 
Even as far back as the late 1920s, college campuses had been the 
site of civil rights protests at Fisk and Howard Universities.142  During 
the 1960s, civil rights protests became especially common on college 
and university campuses across the country, whose students were a 
prominent force of the Civil Rights Movement.  College and 
university students took the lead in the Greensboro, North Carolina 
lunch counter sit-ins;143 they were the “S” in SNCC;144 they gathered by 
hundreds and thousands to protest racial injustice and the Vietnam 
War on the campuses of Columbia,145 Berkeley, and countless other 
universities.  Sometimes the protesters were peaceful but their 
messages provoked violent reactions in those who disagreed; 
sometimes the protests were disruptive because of the time, place, 
and manner in which they occurred; and sometimes the protesters 
themselves turned violent.  Regardless, protests on college campuses 
were of a radically different nature than even the unwelcome button-
pinning and button-throwing in Blackwell. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given this increased level of campus 
protest, during this time college and university students were 
contesting their suspension or expulsion for civil rights protests by 
actively asserting their procedural due process rights.  Accordingly, 
when disciplinary decisions were reversed, such reversals were more 
likely to be based on procedural due process grounds rather than 
because students’ activities passed the Burnside/Blackwell actual 
disruption test.146 
                                                 
 142. The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow:  Fisk University Student Protests (1925–1927), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_fisk.html (last visited April 3, 
2009). 
 143. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 15, at 495; WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 169. 
 144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  See generally CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN 
STRUGGLE:  SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S, at 9–18 (1995) 
(recounting the events that led up to the birth of SNCC); WOODWARD, supra note 10, 
at 169 (discussing SNCC’s formation).  SNCC was founded on the campus of Shaw 
University. 
 145. See, e.g., MARK D. NAISON, WHITE BOY:  A MEMOIR 80–96 (2002) (describing the 
reaction and the subsequent demonstration of the black community of Columbia 
University after King’s death). 
 146. See, e.g., Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 632 (W.D. Mo. 
1968) (after the students were granted process in the form of a hearing, the school 
arrived again at the same disciplinary decision as it reached before the hearing; this 
time, because adequate process had occurred, the district court upheld the school’s 
disciplinary decision); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 171 (W.D. Mo. 
1968) (college students were suspended after staging a demonstration in the 
cafeteria to protest the quality of the food; their suspensions were overturned due to 
inadequate process); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288–89 (D. Colo. 1968) 
(college students were suspended after protesting CIA recruitment and disrupting 
the career services office; their suspensions were upheld as based on constitutional 
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Of the seven higher education cases focusing exclusively on 
student speech after Burnside and Blackwell were decided but before 
the Supreme Court decided Tinker, five involved students’ political 
protests and four of those five grew out of students’ civil rights 
protests at African-American colleges in the South.147  Courts upheld 
the schools’ disciplinary actions in all four of these civil rights protest 
cases.148  These decisions regularly cited Blackwell and Burnside, 
emphasizing deference to school authorities:  Zanders v. Louisiana 
State Board of Education149 cited Burnside and Blackwell for the 
proposition that “[w]ithin our own circuit, the hesitancy of the 
judiciary in questioning the wisdom of specific rules involved recently 
has been expressed”;150 Evers v. Birdsong,151 from Mississippi, cited 
Blackwell and the Tinker district court for the principle that university 
officials “must be given wide discretion in anticipating and 
preventing interruptions in the class room and student activities for 
                                                                                                                 
rules and resulting from appropriate procedural due process); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. 
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (students were suspended for 
their participation in mass demonstrations resulting in property damage; their 
suspensions were overturned due to inadequate process); Due v. Fla. A. & M. Univ., 
233 F. Supp. 396, 402 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (students’ suspensions were upheld where 
students received adequate process); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 
182 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (Tennessee college students were suspended for 
participating in Mississippi freedom rides; their suspensions were overturned due to 
inadequate process); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 947–48, 949, 
952 (C.D. Ala. 1960), rev’d, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (college students were 
expelled for participating in civil rights demonstrations on and off campus; their 
suspensions were overturned due to inadequate process); see also Greene v. Howard 
Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 612–13 (D.D.C. 1967) (because Howard University is a 
private corporation, it was not bound by the due process principles articulated in 
Dixon and could provide notice of the procedures it intended to follow in its 
academic catalogue). 
In 1960, an Alabama district court affirmed a university’s suspension of nine “ring 
leader[]” students who led civil rights demonstrations on campus and in the local 
community.  Dixon, 186 F. Supp. at 947–48, 949, 952.  The Fifth Circuit reversed, 
holding that students had due process rights of notice and a hearing.  Dixon, 294 
F.2d at 159.  Within a decade, Dixon was cited outside the circuit as “generally 
accepted as correct” and “[t]he leading case involving . . . a disciplinary proceeding.”  
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D. W. Va. 1968), aff’d, 399 F.2d 638 (4th 
Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1968), aff’d, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).  The U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri called for oral argument and entered a general order 
regarding college and university student discipline due process rights, anticipating 
that these questions “are likely to be presented in a substantial number of future 
cases.”  Scoggin, 291 F. Supp. at 163. 
 147. Zanders v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 750–52 (W.D. La. 1968); 
Evers v. Birdsong, 287 F. Supp. 900, 901–03 (S.D. Miss. 1968); Jones, 279 F. Supp. at 
195–96; Barker, 283 F. Supp. at 230–32. 
 148. Zanders, 281 F. Supp. at 762–63, 767; Evers, 287 F. Supp. at 906; Jones, 279 F. 
Supp. at 204; Barker, 283 F. Supp. at 236. 
 149. 281 F. Supp. 747. 
 150. Id. at 758 n.26. 
 151. 287 F. Supp. at 900. 
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which the school is operated.”152  Outside the Fifth Circuit, Barker v. 
Hardaway,153 from West Virginia, echoed this latter comment154 and 
Jones v. State Board of Education,155 from Tennessee, cited Blackwell and 
Burnside for the tenet that “provided the procedural requirements are 
met, it is always within the province of school authorities to prohibit 
by regulations acts calculated to undermine school discipline and to 
punish when these regulations have been violated.”156  As in the 
secondary school cases, deference to school officials and 
maintenance of social order were guiding principles for the courts.  
Their society may have been in a racial uproar, but these courts were 
not going to contribute to it by carving out any more room for 
dissent. 
In the fifth protest case, Soglin v. Kauffmann,157 students were 
suspended after they interfered with on-campus interviews conducted 
by Dow Chemical.158  Not surprisingly, Soglin cited Burnside.  But 
rather than using Burnside to support the principle of deference to 
school administrators as the other courts had, the district court cited 
Burnside to emphasize the limitations of school’s authority.159  In this 
way, with its focus on balancing students’ rights and schools’ need for 
order, and its skepticism of the school’s decision, Soglin was a natural 
precursor to Tinker.  After reviewing numerous equal protection and 
due process cases with student plaintiffs over the previous twenty 
years, the district court in Soglin noted prophetically: 
Underlying these developments in the relationship of academic 
institutions to the courts has been a profound shift in the nature of 
American schools and colleges and universities, and in the 
relationships between younger and older people.  These changes 
seldom have been articulated in judicial decisions but they are 
increasingly reflected there.  The facts of life have long since 
undermined the concepts, such as in loco parentis, which have been 
invoked historically for conferring upon university authorities 
virtually limitless disciplinary discretion.160 
                                                 
 152. Id. at 905. 
 153. 283 F. Supp. at 228. 
 154. Id. at 235. 
 155. Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff’d, 
407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969). 
 156. Id. at 198.  The district court in Jones also analogized the facts of the instant 
case to those in Blackwell in which “[t]he record showed an unusual degree of 
commotion, boisterous conduct, collision with the rights of others, and undermining 
of authority as a result of the wearing of these buttons.”  Id. at 204. 
 157. 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff’d, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 158. Id. at 982. 
 159. Id. at 987. 
 160. Id. at 987–88. 
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The district court then invalidated the students’ suspensions as 
impermissibly based on an unconstitutionally overbroad 
“misconduct” provision and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal.161  
The Supreme Court would decide Tinker within a year of the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Soglin. 
The final two higher education cases to cite Burnside and Blackwell 
were from the Fifth Circuit and identified Burnside and Blackwell as 
the circuit rule.  Curiously, in Dickey v. Alabama State Board of 
Education,162 the district court applied the general principle of 
Burnside and ordered that an expelled student be readmitted because 
no disruption would result from the readmission rather than 
analyzing whether the alleged offense had created an actual 
disruption.163  In a similarly creative manner, the district court in 
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University164 used Burnside 
and Blackwell to support the school’s claim in a search and seizure 
case that “‘[r]egulations and rules which are necessary in maintaining 
order and discipline” in a school program “are always considered 
reasonable.”165 
Perhaps unknown to any of the litigants or judges in these cases, 
the district court judge in Burnside had commented in his oral 
opinion: 
If this regulation were in an institution of higher learning, there 
might be some weight to be given to the argument that has been 
made that this is an individual and constructive method of raising 
discussions that could be and ought to be to aid education in a 
college or university where the students have reached higher 
maturity.166 
While this statement eventually would become an accurate 
reflection of the division between elementary/secondary and higher 
education student speech cases, only one of the many courts hearing 
these seven higher education cases shortly before Tinker adopted a 
similar approach. 
In sum, all twelve of these student speech cases (those from 
colleges and universities as well as those from high schools) were 
working their way through the courts more or less at the same time.  
                                                 
 161. Id. at 996. 
 162. 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), appeal held in abeyance, 394 F.2d 490 (5th 
Cir. 1968), vacated as moot sub nom., Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 
1968). 
 163. Id. at 618–19. 
 164. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
 165. Id. at 728 (quoting Dickey, 273 F. Supp. at 617–18) (emphasis omitted). 
 166. Consolidated Brief for Appellants on Appeal, supra note 58, at 16 n.14 
(quoting decision of District Court Judge Mize in Burnside). 
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Even though the language of the actual disruption test was widely 
cited, courts remained inclined to exercise substantial deference to 
school administrators’ decisions, whether the administrators were 
punishing speech retroactively or quashing it prospectively.167  Thus, 
even after Burnside and Blackwell’s significant steps forward, students’ 
speech rights were extremely limited in reality. 
Parties in four of the twelve cases discussed above petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari.168  The Court granted these petitions in 
two cases:  Tinker (by a 5-4 vote)169 and Jones,170 eventually deciding 
Tinker and reversing the grant in Jones without hearing the case. 
C. Not Inevitable:  Tinker v. Des Moines in the Supreme Court171 
Scholars and lawyers today often seem to speak about Tinker as 
though it sprung fully-formed from the Court, much like Athena 
from Zeus’s head, and as though it could not have turned out any 
other way.  To challenge this accepted understanding, this Part 
returns again to the months and days before Tinker was decided, 
reexamining the parties’ arguments, considering the memoranda 
from a law clerk to the author of the majority opinion, evaluating 
drafts of the Tinker opinion, and examining the effect of the last-
minute addition of Burnside and Blackwell to Tinker. 
1. Revisiting the parties’ arguments 
Compared to many of the other student speech cases in the 
pipeline, Tinker presented especially strong facts for the students.  As 
in Burnside and Blackwell, the students in Tinker were engaged in 
serious, political speech as opposed to litigating their “right” to sport 
                                                 
 167. See Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?  Keeping 
Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 65-75 (1996) (discussing the 
competing theories of the purpose of education and the proper levels of deference 
to school officials in each model, and highlighting the Court’s new approach to these 
questions in Tinker). 
 168. Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 856 (1968); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 
1968), aff’d, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969), cert. 
dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970), reh’g. denied, 397 U.S. 1018 (1970); Barker v. Hardway, 
283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D. W. Va. 1968), aff’d, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. 
granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968). 
 169. Docket Sheet, No. 21, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., in 
William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1428, Folder OT—1968 Administrative, Dockets #1-
199, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
 170. 279 F. Supp. at 197. 
 171. Iowa historian John W. Johnson wrote a book-length historical treatment of 
the Tinker case and the players involved.  THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS:  TINKER 
V. DES MOINES AND THE 1960S (1997). 
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Beatles-style haircuts or something similarly frivolous.172  And, unlike 
the speech in Blackwell and in many of the civil rights demonstrations 
in colleges and universities, the Tinker speech did not disrupt the 
educational environment in a significant way.173  This lack of 
disruption might have enhanced the Court’s willingness to grant 
certiorari in Tinker, but at the very least it simplified the issue for the 
Court.174 
As they had done in the courts below, the Tinker plaintiffs argued 
in the Supreme Court for a clear and present danger standard under 
which students’ speech seldom could be restricted by schools.175  They 
further maintained that their speech was constitutionally protected 
under that test.176  The students’ brief compared their actions to those 
of the students in Burnside, arguing not only that both sets of actions 
were “dignified, peaceful gesture[s]” of respectfully dissenting 
citizens, but also that neither situation caused actual disruption of the 
educational process.177  By contrast, the school district argued that the 
Court should employ the actual or reasonably anticipated disruption 
test under which it won in the district court.178  The school district 
also contended that its decisions to discipline its students were 
entitled to significant deference from the courts, yet this credibility-
based claim was undercut by the school district’s own brief which was 
laden with conspiracy theory language.179 
                                                 
 172. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08 (1969); 
see supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text (discussing two cases in which 
students were suspended or not allowed to enroll because of their respective 
hairstyles). 
 173. Id. at 508. 
 174. Three years before deciding Tinker, the Court had noted in a civil rights 
protest case: 
Fortunately, the circumstances here were such that no claim can be made 
that use of the library by others was disturbed in the demonstration.  Perhaps 
the time and method were carefully chosen with this in mind.  Were it 
otherwise, a factor not present in this case would have to be considered.  
Here, there was no disturbance of others, no disruption of library activities, 
and no violation of any library regulations. 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966). 
 175. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (No. 1034). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 19. 
 178. Brief for Respondents at 26, Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (No. 1034). 
 179. See id. at 18–19 (“When Reverend Tinker has four children, ages 15, 13, 11 
and 8 going to their respective schools each with a black arm band, is it more 
reasonable to conclude they were doing this as a matter of conscience in the exercise 
of their constitutional rights, or is Reverend Tinker, the Secretary for Peace and 
Education, through his children, undertaking to infiltrate the school with his 
propaganda?”). 
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2. The Court’s creation of Tinker’s disruption tests 
Between the parties’ briefs (followed by oral argument) and the 
Court’s written opinion, there is, as always, a gap in the official 
record.  Yet, the archived personal papers of several Supreme Court 
justices provide insight into the Court’s process of creating the Tinker 
opinion.  Two types of documents in these files are particularly 
valuable for the purpose of tracing the steps in the creation of 
Tinker’s tests and the eventual incorporation of the tests used in 
Burnside, Blackwell, and the Tinker district court:  first, memoranda 
from a law clerk180 to Justice Fortas, the author of the majority 
opinion, and second, Fortas’s drafts of the opinions, some of which 
were circulated among the Justices.  Taken together, these 
documents reveal that the Tinker tests were hardly a foregone 
conclusion. 
The first post-oral argument document in Justice Fortas’s Tinker 
files is a lengthy memorandum from law clerk Martha Field181 dated 
November 27, 1968.182  Regarding the question of the test to be 
applied, Field cautioned against “lay[ing] down any definitive rule in 
this opinion” in part because the substantial and material 
interference standards at issue in Blackwell, Burnside, and Tinker below 
“are meaningless, because their meaning changes with their 
application.”183  She recommended: 
It seems to me that the best that can be done is to show that the 
same basic tests apply for regulation of the First Am [sic] rights in 
the schools as anywhere else (regulation must be justified by 
substantial state interest), though different interests are of 
importance in the schools (greater importance of order) so that 
the application of the broad standard may lead to different 
results. . . .  At the same time the Court can make clear that it is a 
legitimate interest on the part of the schools to maintain sufficient 
order in the classroom so that educational functions are not 
                                                 
 180. A fascinating literature about the role of Supreme Court law clerks has been 
emerging in recent years.  See, e.g., David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers:  The 
Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007) (reviewing two 
recent books on the same topic). 
 181. Field would go on to become a professor at Harvard Law School and the 
second woman to be awarded tenure there. 
 182. Notably, the memorandum presented the argument that wearing the 
armbands was protectable speech that could be distinguished from other rule-
violating student conduct.  It then established that the First Amendment was 
applicable to schools through the Fourteenth Amendment and, in support of free 
speech, quoted various passages from the Court’s decisions emphasizing the 
importance of schools as creating future citizens.  Memorandum from Martha Field 
to Justice Fortas 4–5 (Nov. 27, 1968), in Abe Fortas Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 
79, Folder 1666, Yale University Library Manuscript Collections. 
 183. Id. at 10. 
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interfered with, and that where there is likelihood that a form of 
“speech” by the students would disrupt this order, the school can 
regulate that speech.184 
In what appears to be a slightly later document (two pages stapled 
in the middle of another copy of the November 27, 1968 
memorandum), Field expanded on this argument, noting that the 
substantial and material disruption test “would have some meaning” 
“[f]or purposes of this case” but because lower courts would find it 
difficult to apply, “[t]he Court should therefore lay down some 
guidelines for how to arrive at a calculation of which interests are 
substantial and what constitutes sufficient evidence of substantial 
interference with them.”185  Had the Court taken this approach and 
been able to produce meaningful guidelines, it could have averted 
many of the uncertainties that have plagued student speech doctrine 
for the past four decades.186 
Field also appeared sympathetic to the school district’s position 
that it should be able to maintain order in its classrooms.  But, raising 
a concern seemingly alien to the lower courts in Tinker and the courts 
deciding the other student speech cases, she speculated that the 
“breadth of discretion” the school district claimed for itself was easily 
abused:  “school officials can hypothesize the requisite likelihood of 
disorder for anything that they don’t like, for whatever reason, 
including reasons that violate the First Amendment, and administer a 
highly discriminatory system.”187  Furthermore, Field noted the 
unobtrusive nature of the Tinker armband protest and analogized it 
to the students who wore freedom buttons in Burnside; in neither 
                                                 
 184. Id. at 10–11.  At a few points, Field suggested that a school district may 
restrict student speech when the restriction is supported by a compelling state 
interest:  “[t]his means that the same test of validity under the First Amendment 
applies in the schools as anywhere else.  In schools, however, unlike other places, the 
State does have a compelling interest in the orderly operation of the classroom.”  Id. 
at 5.  Spelling out this idea, she focused on two issues:  “the danger that the state is 
trying to avert must be a substantial danger, and it must be likely that it will result in 
the absence of the regulation.”  Id. at 8.  Field also noted that the school district’s 
written rationale for the regulation was generated after the students were disciplined, 
but that in her opinion none of the school district’s reasons “constituted a sufficient 
justification for the regulation.”  Id. at 9. 
 185. Memorandum from Law Clerk Marty to Justice Fortas 10 (Nov. 27, 1968), in 
Abe Fortas Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1666, Yale University Library 
Manuscript Collections.   
 186. Much of the student speech literature discusses these difficulties.  See 
Bowman, supra note 87, at 198 (asserting that despite the Court’s precedent, student 
speech doctrine is not clearly defined); Dupre, supra note 167, at 54 (discussing the 
Court’s jurisprudence of discipline and order); Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really 
Be Free Speech in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45 (2008); Taylor, supra note 
107, at 587–91 (discussing unanswered questions about Tinker and substantial 
disruption). 
 187. Memorandum from Martha Field to Justice Fortas, supra note 182, at 7. 
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situation, she suggested, were other students’ rights affected by the 
protesters’ behavior.188  This theme, linked to the idea of non-
disruption and also a regular focus of civil rights protest cases,189 
would carry through to the final version of the majority opinion in 
Tinker, becoming the “rights of others” test190 courts and scholars have 
found to be cryptic ever since.191 
In addition to Field’s insightful memoranda, Justice Fortas’s papers 
also contain drafts of the majority opinion at various stages in its 
development.  These drafts reveal that although Burnside and 
Blackwell eventually formed the foundation of the Court’s test in 
Tinker, early drafts took a different direction.  The document which 
appears to be the earliest typed draft of the majority opinion contains 
no references to Burnside or Blackwell and, accordingly, the specific 
rule of the case is not the same as the published version of Tinker.192  
The rule in this earliest draft swept broadly: 
There can be no doubt that the school authorities would have been 
entirely justified in prohibiting students from engaging in any form 
of expression or any activity which disrupted or interfered with the 
operation of the school or the conduct of classes, or which 
significantly threatened the safety or order of students or faculty.193 
Later in that same draft, another iteration of the rule emerged: 
Persons who are lawfully on [school] premises, at times and in 
circumstances which are within their right, may express their views 
on issues of public importance provided that the form of 
expression does not disrupt or interfere with the purpose or 
function of the school and the orderly conduct of its activities . . . 
including the safety and discipline of other members of the school 
community.194 
On one hand, in this first available draft of Tinker, school officials 
were given a wide berth to quash the speech of students, employees, 
                                                 
 188. Id. at 5. 
 189. See BELL, supra note 10, at 585–88 (discussing balancing school protest rights 
and, more specifically, Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). 
 190. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 191. Barnette also employed the “rights of others” language, but the dispute about 
the meaning of that phrase has occurred in the cases and articles discussing students’ 
affirmative speech rights, not their rights to refrain from speaking.  See, e.g., Harper v. 
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 2006 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 13402 (9th Cir. May 31, 2006) (concluding that a student’s t-shirt 
condemning homosexuality impinged on the rights of other students); Bowman, 
supra note 87, at 201–07 (discussing the rights of others test). 
 192. Ten-page typed draft of majority opinion in Tinker 6, in Abe Fortas Papers, 
Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1667, Yale University Library Manuscript 
Collections. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 7–8. 
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or permitted visitors presumably on the showing of any disruption or 
interference.  Yet at the same time, arguably like Burnside and 
Blackwell, this draft also limited schools’ authority to restrict speech by 
emphasizing the form of the speech as the element giving rise to 
disruption and the one for which the student speakers would be held 
accountable—not the message and not the reaction of other 
individuals in the school environment.195 
But those were not the tests for which Tinker would become well-
known; only after Burnside and Blackwell were incorporated into a late 
draft of the Tinker opinion would the so-called Tinker tests emerge.  In 
the near-final draft—which, for the first time, articulated the 
disruption and rights of others tests—Tinker changed in at least three 
significant ways. 
First, the addition of Burnside and Blackwell caused the Tinker tests 
to become more nuanced.  The primary test was no longer whether 
disruption or interference had occurred at all, in which case the 
speech could be quashed, but rather, quoting Burnside, whether 
speech “materially and substantially interfere[d] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school”196 (if not, the speech was permitted).  As in the earlier draft of 
the opinion, this test sought to balance students’ rights and interests 
in expressing their opinions with the school’s interest in maintaining 
order and delivering education.  Yet, adding the key words from 
Burnside and Blackwell to this version of Tinker both strengthened 
students’ speech rights and made the test more subject to 
manipulation.  Ideally, the “substantial and material” language would 
have led to a greater number of fair results despite having less 
predictability than a more bright-line test.  But, the lack of 
consistency among the past forty years of student speech cases and 
the growing number of open questions about student speech 
doctrine197 demonstrate that this test does not seem to consistently 
produce either predictability or fairness. 
Second, a “reasonable anticipation of substantial and material 
disruption” rule functionally equivalent to the rule employed by the 
                                                 
 195. In 1960s civil rights protest cases, lower courts usually placed “[t]he 
responsibility for disturbances or disruption . . . on the protesters, even though 
disorder was frequently the result of action by police or hostile spectators.”  BELL, 
supra note 10, at 553; see also Berkman, supra note 3 at 591-92. 
 196. Ten-page incomplete typeset and formatted draft of majority opinion in 
Tinker, in Abe Fortas Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1668, Yale 
University Library Manuscript Collections.   
 197. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(discussing qualified immunity and noting the lack of clarity that permeates the 
realm of student speech doctrine). 
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district court in Tinker emerged in this draft as well.198  This was an 
important addition because many of the twelve cases after Burnside 
and Blackwell grappled with situations similar to Tinker in which a 
student’s speech was silenced before any disruption had occurred.  If 
courts recognize (as they do) that it is important for schools to 
maintain order, then schools must be able to act in advance of actual 
disruptions and not always wait to see whether speech produces the 
disruptive effect school officials think it will.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
actual disruption rule was so student-protective that it had not 
permitted proactive restriction.  So, the Court built upon the actual 
disruption test and again balanced the interests of the students and 
the school, requiring the anticipation of substantial and material 
disruption to be “reasonable,” not merely based on an “urgent wish to 
avoid . . . controversy.”199  (As with the actual disruption test discussed 
immediately above, the malleability of “reasonableness” has led to a 
host of problems.) 
Third, by changing the opinion in these ways the Supreme Court 
adopted the test used by the district court below and advocated by the 
school district on appeal—not the test put forth by the students.  
Scholars and students of Tinker regularly lose sight of the fact that it 
was the Court’s decision to overturn the school’s disciplinary decision 
using the school district’s own test that gave rise to this celebrated 
student speech victory.  The school district had counted on the Court 
continuing to defer substantially to school districts’ decision making, 
whether school districts were adopting rules, implementing rules, or 
disciplining students for violating those rules.  But in Tinker, the 
Court diverged from that path and carved out a space for protected 
student protest, not trusting school administrators across the country 
to make the same decision.200 This was a substantial shift, one Richard 
                                                 
 198. Fifteen-page typed draft of majority opinion in Tinker 8, in Abe Fortas 
Papers, Group 858, Series I, Box 79, Folder 1667, Yale University Library Manuscript 
Collections.  “[I]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
suppression of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its 
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompanies expression of an unpopular viewpoint.  
Certainly, where there is no finding and no showing that the exercise of the 
prohibited right would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be 
sustained.”  Id. (citing Burnside).  This fairly final draft elaborated more on 
reasonable anticipation:  “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”  Id. at 7. 
 199. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969). 
 200. See Denno, supra note 88, at 58, 60–62 (commenting that “[a] rather clear 
line of recent cases indicates that the traditional deference paid to educational 
officials in their handling of student expression is at an explicit end” and discussing 
this shift in the Tinker case specifically); Dupre, supra note 167, at 60–61 (discussing 
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Berkman described as based on the thesis “that First Amendment 
rights in the classroom are actually essential to an effective 
educational process in a democracy rather than a source of 
disruption of that process.”201   
3. Justice Black’s dissent and earlier prophetic statement 
In response to Justice Fortas’s majority opinion, Justice Black 
issued a fiery dissent, rejecting the majority opinion on the basis that 
students do not have First Amendment rights in public schools.202  
Three years earlier in a civil rights protest case, Justice Black had 
speculated that an “inevitabl[e]” consequence of reversing the 
breach of the peace conviction of four African-Americans for 
peacefully occupying and refusing to leave a segregated public library 
in Louisiana would be “paralyz[ing] the school[s’]” ability to control 
their educational environments.203  The Tinker majority may not have 
connected its decision with the substance of its civil rights roots as 
overtly, but in his slippery slope declaration a few years earlier, Justice 
Black had identified the link spot on. 
CONCLUSION 
In a 1968 article in the Saturday Review, education professor and 
higher education historian Lewis Mayhew stated that there may be 
“good reason to believe that the present wave of student unrest [is] 
qualitatively different from those [of] earlier times.”204  Summarizing 
                                                                                                                 
the lack of deference the Court accorded the school in Tinker, and how this 
approach represented a significant departure from the cases and social assumptions 
that came before)). 
 201. Berkman, supra note 3, at 581. 
 202. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).  According to the New York 
Times, Justice Black “spoke extemporaneously for about 20 minutes” from the bench 
when the opinion in Tinker was delivered.  He concluded “I want it thoroughly 
known that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any part of what the Court does 
today.”  Fred P. Graham, High Court Upholds a Student Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
1969, at A1. 
 203. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 204. Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 173 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (quoting 
SATURDAY REV., Aug. 17, 1968, at 57) (alteration in original). 
Medieval students rioted, dumped garbage on passersby, wrote erotic or 
ribald poems and read them on church steps and in other sanctuaries of the 
Establishment, coerced their professors and occasionally killed one.  
Colonial college students rioted about food, stole, took pot shots at 
university presidents, protested infringement of their private lives, and 
gradually forced colleges to modify stringent rules regarding personal 
conduct.  Nineteenth century college students took sides over the Civil War 
and demanded a voice in academic governance.  Twentieth century signed 
the Oxford Peace Pledge, joined in the Spanish Civil War, rioted over food, 
violated the Eighteenth Amendment, and experimented with sex. . . . At least 
an important portion of student protest replicates those of the past simply 
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student protest from medieval times through the 1960s, he surmised 
that “[s]tudents have always been difficult to live with and have 
frequently assumed postures which bothered adults and disturbed 
institutions.”205  Whether or not the students’ unrest in the 1960s was 
different, though, the judicial response to students’ non-disruptive 
protest certainly was.  What changed in Burnside, Blackwell, and Tinker 
was that schools were no longer always unquestioned authority 
figures disciplining insubordinate, unruly students.  Students became 
free to engage in peaceful, non-disruptive protest even inside their 
schools.  By arriving at this result, the Court recognized students’ 
citizenship, legitimized their dissent, and channeled that dissent into 
a direction which promoted respect for the rule of law. 
Standing on the shoulders of the Civil Rights Movement and in fact 
relying directly on two civil rights student speech cases, Tinker quickly 
gave rise to a large body of student speech law206 extensively tailored 
within American constitutional doctrine,207 unusual in the 
international context,208 and increasingly full of uncertain 
questions.209  Forty years later, even as student speech doctrine 
becomes increasingly unpredictable, Tinker remains nourished by the 
moral stature of its roots in the Civil Rights Movement. 
                                                                                                                 
because the process of growing up is, after all, a human process that has not 
changed much in quite a few years. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Roughly forty student speech cases were decided in the year following the 
Court’s decision in Tinker.  Paul G. Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools:  
Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEO. L.J. 37, 38–39, nn.3–8 (1970) (citing student speech 
cases decided between 1967 and 1970).  In the eight years following Tinker, the 
watershed case was cited in nearly 500 decisions.  John E. Nichols, The Tinker Case 
and Its Interpretation, 52 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 1, 2 (1977). 
 207. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh My!  A 
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2007).   
 208. The body of student speech law appears unique to the United States.  See, e.g., 
THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
DEMYSTIFYING THE LEGAL ISSUES (Charles J. Russo et al. eds., 2007) (providing an 
overview of thirteen countries’ laws related to students’ rights). 
 209. “Supreme Court precedents have left lower courts with vague standards for 
evaluating student speech, often resulting in conflicting decisions, many of which 
simply defer to the decisions of school administrators.”  BELL, supra note 10, at 588.  
The school district’s attorney in Hazelwood, decided twenty-five years after Tinker, 
expressed the opinion that “‘the Tinker case had been abused.  The original basis for 
Tinker was good but some lower courts had expanded Tinker’” extensively.  Anne 
Proffitt Dupre, The Story of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier:  Student Press and 
the School Censor 247, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff 
Schneider eds., 2008). 
